In the last few weeks there have been further reasons for optimism as the new First and deputy First Ministers, Michelle O’Neill from Sinn Féin and the DUP’s Emma Little-Pengelly, have made sustained efforts to show that they are working together, while they and other ministers have reached out well beyond their political and community bases. Meanwhile, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, despite the doubts of heavyweights in his party, has continued with his recent change of rhetoric and approach, emphasising the need for unionism to take its argument beyond its traditional constituency.

Despite this positive mood music, though, there is scepticism across society that the parties are capable of taking the difficult decisions that are necessary for good governance. The hole in Northern Ireland’s public finances and implementation of the Bengoa report’s recommendations on healthcare reform are just two of the areas where the new Executive will need to act decisively, indeed bravely, as its predecessors failed to do. Perhaps we will not see many difficult policy decisions taken anywhere across the UK before the upcoming UK election. But the devolved institutions have a patchy record as regards good government. The challenges are now imminent and numerous (and were recently brought out in stark detail in a report by the think tank Pivotal).

Continuing instability

There is a widespread sense among the public that the root causes of the instability that have plagued the institutions in recent years have not been comprehensively dealt with by the DUP’s about-turn on Stormont; and hence that another collapse of the institutions is possible before long. Meanwhile, there is a sense among the growing segment of the voting population who describe themselves as neither nationalist nor unionist (primarily the Alliance Party) that the current system, with its dual vetoes based on a binary model of society, undervalues them. All this raises questions about possible reform of the institutions.

While the institutions were in suspension, pressures for reform were growing. Some are determined that the issue should not now slip down the agenda. The Alliance Party, which has long sought reform, maintains its pressure. The Tánaiste, Micheál Martin, speaking in the Dáil and at the recent Alliance Party conference, put forward on behalf of the Irish government a substantial agenda of possible reforms. The SDLP, in its new role as Official Opposition, has also devoted its first main item of Assembly business to the reform issue. Others are less attached to the idea of reform, however. Sinn Féin has acknowledged the issue of vetoes (by which it, and the DUP, are the parties chiefly empowered) might be looked at by the Assembly and Executive Reform Committee (a grouping of cross-party MLAs) but it has hardly seemed enthusiastic. The DUP has shown no wish to look at these issues at all. The British government, meanwhile, has said it sees no need for further action now, and indeed, appears to question the Irish government’s right to become involved in the issue.

House of Commons committee proposals

Late last year, against the threat of a continued DUP boycott, and after extensive evidence-taking, the House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC) produced a report examining the potential for reform. The report called for a new and independently led review of the operation of Stormont, with channels of input for the Dublin government and all parties in Northern Ireland. It also called for a citizens’ assembly to allow for direct input from members of the public. Alongside these recommendations, the NIAC report floated a series of reforms that would amount to a significant reset of the modus operandi of power-sharing. This includes changing the election of the Speaker to a weighted majority (to stop one party from preventing the Assembly from meeting) and the renaming of the heads of government to ‘Joint First Ministers’ (to accurately reflect their equal status and end the polarising race to see who gets the nominally ‘top’ job). There was also some more cautious floating of Executive composition reforms, moving to a super-majority government as opposed to the current mandatory coalition model (essentially a voluntary coalition with support from 60–70% of MLAs in the Assembly as opposed to automatic places in government for the largest parties in each designation). Some of these changes, NIAC argued, could be made by the Westminster Parliament unilaterally. The report garnered support amongst some of the commentariat and the smaller parties but was opposed by the DUP’s members of NIAC and largely ignored by Sinn Féin.

Unilateral changes are now presumably off the table; but at some point, the question of reform – consistent with the general principles of the Agreement – is likely to arise again. Issues around the vulnerability of the institutions to single party vetoes, the binary model of society on which they are based, and their effectiveness in providing good government will come to the fore again. Certainly, many would think the time for reform had come if there were another hiatus in the operation of the institutions. We need an informed debate to prepare the ground on options for reform, of a sort we have not so far had. Discussions about the institutions have tended to be for the political parties, and a few insider-specialists. These discussions may appear to lie in the domain of the nerd, but their significance is potentially great – they may ultimately make the difference as to whether the Agreement institutions, indeed the Agreement settlement, can operate effectively at all. They require wider involvement from voices across civil society, academia, and as much of the public as possible.

The major review sought by NIAC may not be imminent but a good starting point would be a technical report on the possible reforms, drawing on the material prepared for NIAC and other recent contributions. There are some tricky questions here beyond the shape and process of the institutions themselves. One is the degree of support properly needed for change. The Agreement was reached on the basis of ‘sufficient consensus’, which included a majority of both unionist and nationalist representatives, and the British and Irish governments. In putting forward subsequent changes, the governments have generally sought a similar level of support. On the other hand, this doctrine does give those who enjoy vetoes on decision-making under the present system a veto also on change.

There is an inevitable trade-off on this front. Academic projects and reports, including several which we have been involved in at the UCL Constitution Unit, have canvassed various options among experts and the public, but none offer a panacea in themselves. If the institutions collapse through the action of one party, there is no Agreement-blessed scheme for governing Northern Ireland at all. There is an argument that a lesser degree of support for changes to the operation of Stormont should be needed in such circumstances, at least for temporary measures to ensure that something similar to what the Agreement proposed continues. That being said, there will always be those who fear short-term solutions will become long-term measures that disadvantage their side.

What role for the Irish Government

Another question the reform debate brings to the fore is the role of the Irish government in this debate and decisions flowing from it. It is true that in the negotiations that led to the 1998 Agreement, the Irish government did not participate in detailed discussion about the internal Northern Ireland institutions. Nevertheless, they were part of the decision-making on the Agreement as a whole; and they have a general right under the Agreement to participate in reviews and put forward views about non-devolved Northern Ireland matters through the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. From the negotiation of the Agreement until the resolution of the last hiatus in 2020, they were closely involved alongside the British government in resolving political problems in Northern Ireland – including institutionally-focused ones – and advancing constructive politics. It is a cause for some concern that the Irish government were kept at arm’s length from the negotiations that led to the latest settlement with the DUP. Many have argued since publication that the British government’s paper on Safeguarding the Union reflects anything but the even-handed approach the two governments have in the past sought to maintain. That negotiation may have brought the institutions back; but at a cost to trust in the British government outside unionism (and within large segments of it), which stands at an extremely low level. This is unlikely to be a sustainable model for future interventions and reveals questionable faithfulness to the Agreement more generally.

It was not envisaged in 1998 that the institutional structures would last forever, unchanged – the fact there are review provisions within the Agreement demonstrates this. Decisions about reform will be needed at some point, and they must not be made by insiders alone, debating behind closed doors. Everyone – not just the politicians – needs to talk…