Northern Ireland barely featured in the Irish election campaign. In being cautious and pragmatic, the Programme for Government reflects that general indifference. The section on “Building our Shared Island and Rebuilding Ireland-UK Relations” occupies just under two pages – nos. 142 and 143.

Shared Island Initiative

Most space is devoted to the Shared Island Initiative, with a long list of current and future projects to be supported through the Shared Island Fund. The Fund’s resources are to increase by a further 1 billion up to 2035. This is in some ways a very substantial amount, and proof of the Government’s commitment. The Fund aims to promote a wide range of investment and co- operation, much of it innovative, with clear added value for both parts of the island. However, in economic terms it is far from transformative: on an annualised basis it represents just 0.4% of Northern Ireland’s budget and 0.09% of the Republic’s – or about 1% of the UK subvention.

It has repeatedly been made clear that the Shared Island Initiative has nothing to do with the prospect of a future United Ireland. It is understood that unionist toleration of it would otherwise be impossible. It is a long way, whether in its conception, its scale or its form, from offering a template for the future. It is very much Micheál Martin’s brainchild, and an expression of his long-held belief that reconciliation and practical cooperation must take precedence over traditional Fianna Fáil policy.

British-Irish structures

The Programme for Government also calls for new arrangements to encourage enhanced interaction between the British and Irish Governments. It envisages annual summits between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister, as agreed between the previous Taoiseach and Keir Starmer last September. The first of these summits was held in Liverpool on 5/6 March and resulted in numerous commitments in the areas of security, maritime policy, investment, innovation and energy, and culture, youth and education. Ministers are to work together to advance these commitments, supported by a steering group led by the UK Cabinet Office and the Department of the Taoiseach.

These structures, and the ambitious work programme, are reminiscent of a previous initiative by David Cameron and Enda Kenny, which began in 2012. It demonstrated the excellence of the British-Irish relationship as it was then, just after the Queen’s visit to Ireland. Its first few years yielded some, relatively modest, results. One of its themes was co-operation in the European Union. Predictably, it was washed away by Brexit. The reset of 2024/5 has only become possible with a change of British Government. The question is whether there is enough of real substance, going beyond the aspirational, to UK-Irish relations improved with the electionof the current UK Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer maintain political interest and to make summits more than an agreeable gathering. Improved EU- UK solutions would create enhanced prospects of this.

The Liverpool communiqué concludes: “Together we will ensure this complements the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement and their crucial role at the heart of our essential and unique relationship”. The Irish Programme for Government “reaffirms its commitment to the successful functioning of the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement” – and says nothing more.

In fact, the Shared Island Initiative overshadows the North/South Ministerial Council. The NSMC and its secretariat work away, as do the implementation bodies it oversees. After a three-year gap caused by the collapse of Stormont, there have been thirteen sectoral and two plenary meetings in the past year. The topics addressed by leaders have included infrastructure, climate change and biodiversity, and business and trade. But it is under the radar. Ideally, the Shared Island Initiative should be subsumed within the NSMC. But the difficult financial situation of the Executive, accompanied by continuing unionist reluctance to see the NSMC develop, means that funding for new projects, some within Northern Ireland, is not agreed and secured jointly, but supplied by Dublin.

The British-Irish Council is largely invisible, save when it provides a convenient occasion for meetings in the margins. It is seriously hampered by the enormous disparities between its members: two sovereign governments, three devolved administrations with varied powers, two Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. The smaller members are the most enthusiastic, not least because they can meet directly with the British Government. This might change with new internal UK arrangements for regional consultation. While in principle the new British- Irish work programme could fit within the BIC structures, this was never contemplated.

Likewise, the other British-Irish structure, the Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC – heir to the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference of 1985–99) could in principle encompass the new agenda. Some analysts think that an opportunity was wasted in not employing it. However, the BIIGC has resumed its core function of bringing together the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Northern Ireland Secretary to discuss Northern Ireland-related issues: in December, these were legacy, the Omagh inquiry, the Common Travel Area and paramilitarism. It appears to be doing so with renewed vigour. The officials supporting it specialise in Northern Ireland affairs and adding new and broader functions would sit oddly with its normal work and add no obvious value.

Northern priorities

The Assembly and Executive are far and away the most important institutions of the Agreement.. Formally, they are not a matter for the Irish Government, but that distinction has been blurred through the multiple breakdowns. Before the restoration of the institutions last year, Micheál Martin called for reform. Alliance continues to urge the two Governments to involve themselves. But most parties are indifferent, if not opposed. Reform is not near the top of any British to-do list. And Micheál Martin has not spoken about it again.

A conspicuous absence from the Programme for Government is any mention of planning for a unity referendum and a possible United Ireland. In the election Sinn Féin and, less predictably, Labour, both called for ambition, as have numerous academics and commentators. In its manifesto Fianna Fáil alluded to the issue in a convoluted way, but even this fell by the wayside. Unlike his predecessor as leader of Fine Gael, Leo Varadkar, Simon Harris has made clear that this is in not a priority for him. It seems to be the view that a referendum will not happen during the lifetime of the government, that the public at large is not interested, and that talking about it would complicate relationships with unionists and the British government. Recent ARINS polling suggests that there might be some more openness, even among opponents of unity, to embarking on preparatory work, but that proposition is most unlikely to be tested in the next five years.

The Good Friday institutions which really matter are those at Stormont. Those dealing with North/South and East-West relations do good work, but are a long way from playing the “crucial role at the heart of our essential and unique relationship” asserted by the two heads of government. Both the Shared Island Initiative and the new UK-Irish arrangements are outside the structures of the Good Friday Agreement – but, crucially, are in full accordance with its spirit.