This article proposes two new sub-polities to maximise both Ulster-British and nationalist cultural autonomy in a unified Irish state. British identity would be sustained even if Great Britain were to disintegrate following Scottish independence. The vast majority of Northern nationalists would be in the same sub-polity as Southerners, allowing them to be as uncomplicatedly and equivalently Irish. The proposed sub-polities may be a means to also secure losers’ consent amongst unionists, as well as convincing non-communal voters that a reunified Ireland would respect its British minority.

Detailed polling data from ARINS are providing us with much food for thought¹. However, the irresistible force of Southern voters wanting a unitary state without British trappings would appear to be in irresolvable collision with the immovable object of unionists wanting such a state to have significant expression of their Britishness, should that ever come into existence. Brendan O’Leary recently stated that Southerners “are strikingly more hostile to the Commonwealth than they are to joining NATO”².

Northern Ireland, in voting for reunification, will have become a place where unionists will have existentially ‘lost’ to reunificationists.

Creative thinking by reunificationists is more likely to both sway some centre-ground voters towards reunification and gain losers’ consent among sizeable swathes of unionist voters.

The vast majority of Southern voters would like the new reunified state to be as close as possible to the Irish Republic in terms of non-expression of any symbols of Britishness. Northern nationalists in Ardoyne, Clonoe and Crossmaglen would like to feel as uncomplicatedly Irish in this new reunified state as voters in Ardagh, Clonown and Crossmolina. Unionists in Ballinamallard, Comber, Cullybackey, the Fountain, Moygashel and Richhill are likely to want as much expression of their Britishness as possible in a new reunified state. Robert Frost had a point when he wrote that “good fences make good neighbors”. A transformed type of boundary could be a scar that has healed rather than a wound that still festers.

Many boundaries, not just one border: it would be impossible to demarcate one line along the shatter zone of interdigitating identities without ontologically threatening sizeable populations on both sides (fig.1). That is what happened in 1920. Over four-fifths (82%) of the border length saw partitioning within religious communities: 65% of the border partitioned Catholic-plurality areas, with 17% of the border partitioning Protestant-plurality communities. As regards partitioning between religious communities, 5% of the Border separated Northern Catholic-plurality areas from Southern Protestant-plurality areas. Only 13% of the Border length separated Northern Protestant-plurality areas from Southern Catholic-plurality areas.

Figure 1. Religious plurality in Ulster and Louth: 1911 and 2011–21 censuses³.

The 1926 Census counted 769,000 Protestants. In 2021 there were 828,000 Protestants (including people who had a Protestant upbringing)⁴. A reunified Ireland, peacefully secured with a tolerant settlement, is very likely to have more people from a northern Protestant background than Northern Ireland had in 1920.

Reimagining Northern Ireland into two (many-boundaried) sub-polities, in the context of building a transformed Ireland, addresses the geographic reality of Ulster-British identity in such a new polity. Such reimagining would also be sufficiently agile as to not diminish the desire of Northern reunificationists to be as uncomplicatedly Irish as citizens of the twenty-six counties. And such reimagining may be able both to untie the Gordian knots of Commonwealth association, flag and anthem; and to demonstrate to reunification-agnostic centrists that the South is serious about accommodating the multiplicity of identities in the northeastern part of the island.

“Britain-in-Ulster” and “Gaeldom”: two sub-polities in a unified Ireland

Most of the island would be in an area of ‘maximised Irishness’: a place where neither Union flag nor Commonwealth would have any role in everyday life beyond current Southern minimal experience. I will call that part of the island “Gaeldom”. The remainder of the island, while also being in a reunified Ireland, would be a place where the unionist majority can maximise the expression of their British identity. I will call this sub-polity “Britain-in-Ulster” (BIU).

Britain-in-Ulster and Gaeldom could only exist after a border poll had resulted in reunificationist victory. The envisaged Britain-in-Ulster and Gaeldom boundaries could be determined by plebiscite. An independent panel of experts in politics and social geography could draw up appropriate plebiscitary communal voting areas (CVAs) that satisfy a localised sense of community identities so that, for example, both small (e.g. the Fountain or Short Strand) and large (e.g. north Down or the Glens of Antrim) identity-coherent areas could be regarded as CVAs.

Firstly, both the details of Britain-in-Ulster, Gaeldom and the plebiscite wording would need to be widely debated before a border poll so that voters were fully aware of the CVA-plebiscitary proposals during the border poll campaign.

Secondly, each CVA would vote to elect a Patron: either the President of Ireland or the British Monarch. A CVA that voted to have the British Monarch as Patron would become part of Britain-in-Ulster. The other CVAs would become part of Gaeldom. One could envisage the Monarch appointing a member of the Royal Family to be a permanent representative for Britain-in-Ulster, with the Irish government paying for the upkeep of Hillsborough Castle and Gardens.

Thirdly, an appropriate time for the plebiscite would be 12–18 months after a pro-reunification border poll result.

Fourthly, an appropriate name for these sub-polities would need to be agreed. It would be appropriate for this decision to be made by the voters of these new sub-polities in a preferendum.

The likely religious breakdown of BIU and Gaeldom?

Data from the 2024 ARINS survey on Commonwealth membership were applied to religion data from the 2021 census at data zone level⁵. Table 1 shows the intra-religion split between BIU and Gaeldom, whereas Table 2 shows the inter-religion split within both BIU and Gaeldom. Approximately one-eighth of the island’s population would be in BIU.

In order to assuage localised ethnic cleansing fears, one could envisage the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, perhaps comprising units both from EU countries that have large Catholic and Protestant populations (e.g. Germany) and from Commonwealth countries with a history of Ulster emigration (e.g. Canada). Observers from such countries could be deployed during the border poll to build up a knowledge base in advance of any BIU/Gaeldom plebiscite.

Characteristics of Britain-in-Ulster

A congruent boundary between the unionist population and Britain-in-Ulster would result in a sub-polity boundary length significantly greater than the current border, because it would have to demarcate communal exclaves (e.g. Glens of Antrim, Kesh, Tiger’s Bay, Short Strand). Such a tortuous cartographic creation would make impracticable the devolution of policing, education and other public services.

The inhabitants of BIU could have rights regarding the flying of the Union flag over war memorials and BIU-related buildings throughout the entire year, designated bonfire locations, and minimal restrictions on Twelfth marches. Britain-in-Ulster would not be able to be a Commonwealth member as it would not be a sovereign government. However, it could be eligible to enter a team in the Commonwealth Games. (Perhaps the Commonwealth could consider creating Associate membership specifically for Britain-in-Ulster.) One could also imagine BIU being a member of the British-Irish Council. A BIU body could be elected by voters to oversee the appointment of representatives for the above organisations. Such a body could also nominate, say, two members to the House of Lords to represent BIU in Westminster.

Would BIU be controlled by loyalist paramilitaries?

No. Britain-in-Ulster would be part of a unitary Irish state. Parliamentary representation will be in the all-Ireland parliament. The civil rights of Irish citizens in BIU and British citizens in Gaeldom would be protected in both the updated Irish constitution and in the international agreement with the United Kingdom that would be negotiated as part of the reunification process. Therefore, neither BIU nor Gaeldom would be able to pass laws to enshrine discrimination against some of their inhabitants.

The boundaries of Gaeldom and Britain-in-Ulster would be based on people rather than on older immutable land units such as counties. I envisage a repeating plebiscite process, following CVA boundary revision by an independent panel of experts, perhaps every 25 years. This time interval is likely long enough for this process to not be a continually festering sore. A CVA that was not previously in Britain-in-Ulster could vote to join (thus leaving Gaeldom), and vice-versa. This dynamic process would ensure that Britain-in-Ulster can never have a nationalist majority.

A permanently unionist sub-polity freed from betrayal by London: Britain-in-Ulster would be a continuing sub-polity freed from betrayal by London and not dependent of the existence of either the United Kingdom or Great Britain: Scottish independence would bring both the UK and GB to an end, whereas BIU would still exist. The post-reunification constitution could stipulate that any referenda concerning BIU-related articles would have to secure the agreement of the BIU electorate. Given that BIU would always have a unionist majority, the Gaeldom electorate could not abolish BIU. Thus, BIU would exist as long as its unionist voters wanted it to.

Should reunification occur, many unionists will fear that they will cease to exist as Ulster-British people. Britain-in-Ulster offers a spatial possibility where each individual can innovate and negotiate, on their own terms, the evolution of their sense of identity, both in a reunified democratic Ireland that is secular-republican not Protestant-monarchical, and in a sub-polity which has strong Commonwealth and British monarchical links. This is not to say that people will stop having Ulster-Britishness as their primary identity: they will be able to practice individual identity innovation in the context of an also-transforming and pluralising Irish identity⁷.

The unionist areas occasionally engulfed by violence since 2000 represent a tiny proportion of both the areal extent and population of BIU. Indeed, most of that putative sub-polity saw relatively low levels of violence during the Troubles (see fig.2). The vast majority of Protestants (77 per cent) are reconciled to Northern Ireland reunifying with the South, according to the 2024 ARINS polling (with a figure of 60 per cent for both DUP and TUV voters)⁸. One imagines this reconciled percentage for Protestants would increase should such a sub-polity as Britain-in-Ulster be part of the reunification package.

Figure 2. Wards with above-average paramilitary death rates during the Northern Ireland Troubles (1969–2001).

Resolving the flag and anthem issues

Britain-in-Ulster could adopt the Ulster banner, and Gaeldom could adopt the tricolour. A new flag for the unitary state would be necessary. A range of flags could be voted upon by preferendum, with the stipulation that the winning flag would need to be approved in both sub-polities. The process for choosing a new unitary-state anthem could replicate the above flag-choosing process with polity-wide and island-wide preferendums. “Amhrán na bhFiann” could become the polity anthem for Gaeldom, and “God Save the King” for BIU. The debate relating to the new island-wide state flag and anthem selection process offers an opportunity for state-building legitimacy.

Concluding remarks

The post-reunification model outlined here would enable resolution of the flag, anthem and Commonwealth-membership issues. It proposes an Ulster-British-dominated sub-polity that would exist in perpetuity, even if the GB and the UK were to collapse. It fully reintegrates the vast majority of northern reunificationists with Southerners. And it offers a relatively low level of cultural and political disruption to Southerners.

1. See https://www.ria.ie/research-programmes/arins/arins-the-irish-times-north-and-south-surveys-2024-results/.
2. Brendan O’Leary, ARINS podcast 42 “ARINS/Irish Times survey results discussion”, March 2025, available at https://www.ria.ie/audio/arins-podcast-42-arins-irish-times-survey-results-discussion/
3. Based on maps from (a) the Boundary Commission Report (Report of the Irish Boundary Commission, 1925 (1969), introduced by Geoffrey J. Hand, Irish University Press, Shannon), and (b) Skate Tier (2014) (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Religion_Or_Religion_Brought_Up_In_Northern_Ireland_Census_2011.png (accessed January 22nd 2018))
4. The number of people in the 2021 census who chose “Protestant and other Christian (including Christian-related)” as their “current religion” was 711,000, with 116,600 describing this category as their “religion of upbringing”. See the NISRA webpage https://www.nisra.gov.uk/system/files/statistics/census-2021-main-statistics-for-northern-ireland-phase-1-statistical-bulletin-religion.pdf (accessed June 30th 2025).
5. The 2024 ARINS polling data for Northern Ireland on Commonwealth membership, should reunification occur, is perhaps a reasonable proxy for a close border poll result, with a one per cent difference between pro- and anti-Commonwealth membership. Excluding “don’t knows” and “not stated” responses, the responses were: “rejoin Commonwealth” (26% Catholic, 74% Protestant, 40% others); “don’t rejoin Commonwealth” (74%, 26%, 60%). Pat Leahy, “South opposed to joining Nato or Commonwealth to smooth unity”, Irish Times, p.4, Saturday February 8th 2025.
6. The data were sourced from the NISRA website at https://build.nisra.gov.uk/en/custom/data?d=PEOPLE&v=DZ21&v=RELIGION_BELONG_TO_DVO .
7. For more on Individual Identity Innovation, see Jennifer Todd, Identity change after conflict: ethnicity, boundaries and belonging in the two Irelands, 2018, London, pp.100-117.
8. 48% of Protestants were either ‘not happy, but could live with it’; 29% would ‘happily accept’ reunification. See pages/slides 20-23 of https://www.ria.ie/assets/uploads/2025/03/ARINS-IT_NIsummary_2024.pdf.