The “new era in EU relations” was sealed with a carefully-choreographed summit in London on 19 May 2025, reflected in the usual diverse press reports.

“The new era in EU relations” ( (The Times) and the “win–win deal” (The Mirror) – or, if you’d prefer,  “Starmer’s Surrender” (Daily Mail) and the “Betrayal of Brexit Britain” (Daily Express) 

The event bore all the hallmarks of those we’ve become used to since the 2016 referendum: the tantalizing pre-briefings to favoured journalists, the hyping-up of the UK’s ‘wins’, EU angst about the UK’s over-spinning, the hyperbolic reaction of the tabloids… But, all drama aside, how different are the prospects for the UK–EU relationship following that much-anticipated ‘reset summit’?

In order to answer that, we need to be clear about what it is that constitutes the ‘reset’. There were three main documents issued as part of the package, excluding the political agreements (such as on fishing access to UK waters), which are an uncomfortable reminder of the asymmetry of the post-Brexit relationship.

Strategic Partnership

The first document is the Joint Statement on the UK and EU’s new ‘Strategic Partnership’. This could best be described as the UK’s clear allying with its European neighbours on some of the trickier geopolitical problems of the day. The two stated their ‘steadfast dedication to the rules-based international order’, and ‘the fundamental tenets of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law’. They also stated their commitment to the UN Charter and to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This was not only an implied reproach to President Trump (who took the US out of the UN Human Rights Council) but also to the ECHR-sceptic predecessors in the UK government.  

In practical terms, the statement also promised regular ‘high level meetings’ on such matters as the economy and justice, ‘dialogues’ on defence twice a year, and an annual summit overseeing the existing and new UK–EU agreements and ‘maximizing opportunities for future cooperation’. Having a good relationship with one’s neighbour requires regular communication (who knew?). The challenge, however, is that for the EU this will be in addition to (or sidelines of) its intense internal conversations. Making such meetings work will require tremendous diplomatic as well as bureaucratic efficacy on both sides.

Security and Defence Partnership

The second document of the reset is on the UK–EU Security and Defence Partnership. This is described as a ‘framework for dialogue and cooperation’, and it is vast. It covers everything from ‘peacebuilding and crisis management’ to ‘countering hybrid threats and resilience of critical infrastructure’. With references to global health, climate, space, illicit finance, terrorism and migration, the document reflects the massive scale of security challenges facing the UK today. The growing sense of peril on the world stage no doubt helped concentrate minds in Europe towards collaboration with the UK in ways they eschewed in the rounds of original negotiations.

Common Understanding

The third document of the reset is titled ‘Common Understanding: a renewed agenda for EU–UK cooperation’. And, for all the promises strewn around the summit, it is indeed best that we think of this as an agenda rather than a deal. There are six main items on it, including that security partnership; some contain more substance than others. Of most interest to Northern Ireland is the agenda to ‘work towards establishing’ an Agreement for a common Sanitary & Phytosanitary Area. What is notable is that this is quite so ambitious, potentially with the effect of making many of the special requirements for moving agri-food and plant products into NI effectively redundant. Also of interest to NI is another agreement they want to ‘work towards establishing’, namely on linking emissions trading schemes. There has been a danger of NI falling in between the two stools of UK and EU schemes in this area, and UK–EU alignment here is a way of minimising that risk.

One thing that is missing from the Common Understanding, however, is developments in relation to customs processes; thus, for as long as the Windsor Framework is operational, the ‘Irish Sea border’ will continue to have an effect on movement of goods from/via GB to NI. As a consequence, difference in the ways the UK and EU trade with the USA in the future (e.g. if the EU puts higher tariffs on US goods than the UK), could have implications for NI. Some reassurance on this comes from the fact that the UK Government is no longer denying this and is actively engaged in monitoring the effects of the sea border.

What we need to be most aware of, though, is that very little of the UK–EU reset deal is done already (see Figure 1). In fact, the consequences of getting the deal done are still to be faced – long before any benefits can be realised.

First and foremost, getting it across the line will require the UK’s full implementation of the Windsor Framework. The EU has been at pains to insist that the future relationship is utterly dependent on the UK fulfilling the terms of the agreements it already has with the EU. The most tricky of these remains the Windsor Framework (formerly known as the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland). And, you’ll recall (Fortnight issue, 490), that the final phases of implementation are to be the most demanding.

Border control

In real terms, the new border control posts in NI ports will be completed and ‘not for EU’ labelling is to be included on all agrifood products sold in Northern Ireland that have used the ‘green lane’ to get here from GB, including  branded goods. Conscious that there is a risk that some companies will consider the cost of labelling for the NI market alone a price not worth paying, the UK Government has intervened to indicate that such a decision will incur financial penalties. It is yet another example of a ‘flexible and imaginative solution’ to NI’s peculiar position; it needs to work. Proper implementation of the ‘Irish sea border’ for agrifood products is a condition of Britain achieving a more open border for such products with the EU. This may seem bizarre, even absurd, but what is being tested here by the EU is nothing less than the trustworthiness of the UK. If they stumble yet again over that sea border, the chances of realising the ‘win-win’ reset diminish further. The EU are as aware as the Labour party is that a second term in government is far from guaranteed.

And, be in no doubt, Labour tread a thin line here. Northern Ireland’s experience since 2021 exemplifies the difficulties of dynamic alignment as the condition for a more open border. Not only does it mean a limitation on the scope for policy innovation in Westminster, Holyrood and the Senedd – it also means tough challenges for domestic legislators in monitoring and scrutinising updates to the legislation that applies. Just ask any member of Stormont’s Democratic Scrutiny Committee. The political and the practical challenges are not impossible to address but they do need acknowledging and resourcing. And what that takes is an ability to meet accusations of surrender and betrayal with a convincing explanation as to the value of compromise and cooperation in the new world disorder.